From backdoor to backstop: the Irish-British-European triangle, with leading academics, Helen Thompson, Niamh Gallagher and Paul Bew

 From backdoor to backstop: the Irish-British-European triangle

Professor Brendan Simms hosts an expert academic panel speaking to the Centre for Geopolitics at the University of Cambridge to discuss the historical relationship between Britain, Ireland and continental Europe. How do the dynamics of this triangle affect relations after Brexit and European politics? Is Ireland still a vulnerable “backdoor” to England that European powers can exploit? Are British politicians still making an age-old error of underestimating Ireland’s power? And can Ireland ever reconcile close ties to Britain with its alliances in Europe? 

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• Executive summary
• About the speaker and discussant
• Watch the conversation
• What was said?

Executive summary

• For centuries Ireland was seen as the exposed “backdoor” to Britain. Niamh Gallagher explains that, from the 1500s Ireland became “strategically important” to the English Crown, and was tied to an “ideological project” of spreading Protestantism. It was also a strategic “liability”, offering rival states a potential staging area for an invasion of Britain. Successive Continental powers such as Spain and France thus supported and sought to capitalise on Irish rebellions.
• The island of Ireland re-emerged as a point of strategic vulnerability for the British Government around Brexit. The imperative to preserve the open border between the Republic and the North (established by the Good Friday Agreement), as UK and EU goods and customs rules diverged, created a difficult policy conundrum. Helen Thompson argues that Remainers saw Northern Ireland as “the best means” to prevent Brexit - in terms of “structural logic” it was “quite obviously the point to press”, especially given the lack of credible UK Government solutions. 
• The British have a long history of not taking Ireland seriously enough, says Lord Bew. This “very benign”, but somewhat “patronising” view of Ireland leads policymakers to underestimate the threat that Ireland can pose. 
• Since its independence, Ireland has faced difficult dilemmas balancing its relationships with Britain and the Continent. Éamon de Valera led Ireland through its trade war with Britain in the 1930s, but he also had an “uneasy relationship with Europe” (Gallagher). Gallagher describes how in the postwar decades, Ireland tried to “maintain connections with Europe and distance itself from Britain, but at the same time found it really hard to break this connection” with its closest neighbour and largest trade partner.
• Helen Thompson sees European monetary union as a key moment of economic divergence between Britain and Ireland. Ireland’s decision to join the Euro, whilst Britain maintained sterling, was a “consequential” turning point that set many of the circumstances for later "Anglo-Irish" conflict over Brexit.

About the discussants

	Niamh Gallagher is author of the Whitfield Prize winner, Ireland and the Great War: A Social and Political History (2019), co-editor of The Political Thought of the Irish Revolution (2022) and co-convenor of The Cambridge Future of the Island of Ireland series. She is the DFA-funded University Lecturer in Modern Irish History at Cambridge.
	Helen Thompson is Professor of Political Economy at the University of Cambridge. She is the author of several major works including Disorder: Hard Times in the 21st Century (2022) and Oil and the Western Economic Crisis (2017). She was a regular panellist on world renowned podcast, Talking Politics, and a columnist for the New Statesman.
	Paul Bew is Emeritus Professor at the School of History, Anthropology, Philosophy, Politics and International Relations at Queen's University Belfast. He is the author of several major works on the history of Ireland, including Land and the National Question in Ireland, 1858–82 (1978) and Ireland: The Politics of Enmity 1789–2006 (2007). He has been actively involved in politics, serving at different stages as an advisor to the late David Trimble (UUP) and now as a cross-bencher in the House of Lords.

About the moderator

Brendan Simms is Professor of the History of European International Relations and Director of the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge. He has written extensively on the history of German-British relations, the European Union, nationalism and humanitarian intervention. He is founder and President of two think-tanks: the Henry Jackson Society, which advocates for the promotion of liberal democracy and human rights worldwide, and the Project for a Democratic Union, which seeks a “full Political Union of Europe” on a federal model. His most recent book is The Silver Waterfall: How America Won the War in the Pacific at Midway (2022), co-authored with Steven McGregor.

Watch the conversation

What was said?

To understand the triangular relationship between Ireland, Britain and Europe, a longue durée perspective is needed. Niamh Gallagher offers an overview of this 500-year history. She explains how since the 1500s, Ireland has been seen as a “backdoor” to England, and later Britain: a conception that has waxed and waned over the centuries but one that can be spotted nonetheless. From the 1500s, when the English Crown led the conquest of Ireland and colonisation by English and Scottish settlers, the island became a strategically important asset. The conquest of Ireland was an ideological project, part of a wider European struggle between Protestantism and the Roman Catholic Church, as well as between England and shifting continental 'enemies'. Ireland was a liability for English monarchs, who sought to reduce the risk through settlement. 

When sailors from the Spanish Armada washed ashore in Ireland, English soldiers were sent to find and execute them, along with Irish lords who had assisted them. Philip continued to finance and assist Irish rebellions after the Armada. And when France had replaced Spain as the major Continental power, it too saw Ireland as a strategic weak-point for England. The French First Republic sought to coordinate amphibious landings in Ireland with the United Irishmen during the Rebellion of 1798. These European connections continued to shape and influence Irish revolutionary thought; Irish revolutionaries in 1848 ideologically identified with revolutions on the continent, and their leaders had travelled to Paris to meet with like-minded foreign radicals. Some of the 1916 revolutionaries had strategic connections with Germany - Roger Casement, for instance, had travelled there to persuade Irish POWs to fight for Germany against the UK. 

In its early decades of independence, Ireland faced difficult foreign policy dilemmas, navigating its relationships with Britain and the Continent at a time when geopolitics were very much in flux. Éamon de Valera, who led Ireland through much of this period, was unafraid of confrontation with Britain, engaging in a major trade war through the 1930s, but he also had an uneasy relationship with Europe. He maintained Irish neutrality through World War Two. In Paul Bew's opinion, de Valera declined Churchill’s very credible offer of Northern Ireland for joining the Allied war effort in May 1940: a “completely rational choice” given Britain’s high likelihood of defeat at this point. 

Gallagher explains that in the postwar decades, Ireland tried to maintain connections with Europe and distance itself from Britain, but at the same time found it really hard to break this connection. The UK was still Ireland’s largest trade partner, and in Brendan Simms’ words, Ireland ended up joining the European Economic Community in 1973 on Britain’s coattails - that was their way in. But Helen Thompson argues that European integration ultimately led the Republic and the UK on diverging paths, economically and politically. There is fragmentation is this story. The UK rejected monetary union, whilst Ireland joined the euro, serving to break the link with sterling. This was a consequential turning point, which ultimately set many of the circumstances for Anglo-Irish confrontation over Brexit. 

In the wake of the June 2016 Brexit vote, Ireland re-emerged as a point of strategic vulnerability for the British Government. The 1998 Belfast/Good Friday agreement had established an open border between the Republic and the North as a tenet of the peace process, and British policymakers struggled to reconcile this with the UK diverging from EU goods and customs regulations. Thompson says that Brexit campaigners and the Conservative Government had done minimal planning for this issue, leaving a policy lacuna. In terms of structural logic, Northern Ireland became quite obviously the point to press for Remainers in her view. It appeared the best means by which Brexit could be stopped. Simms asks Thompson whether some of the concern expressed around the Good Friday Agreement by Remainers was in reality an attempt to return to the EU via the “backdoor”. Thompson resists making a judgement on individuals’ motivations. 

Lord Bew says these Remainers were held close by Dublin to exert pressure on the British Government, then quickly swept out the door when the EU settled on the Withdrawal Agreement in November 2018. He says that the British have a long history of underestimating Ireland, taking a very benign view of the island that is both patronising and inaccurate. Bew recalls how fellow historian Derek Beales was shocked at Bew’s finding that Irish neutrality had cost the lives of around 7,000 British sailors in WWII. Beales, in classic British fashion, hadn’t taken Ireland seriously and recognised the harm policies over it, or its own policies, can cause. Theresa May made a similar error, taking a patronising view of Ireland early in Brexit negotiations, before realising the difficulties it could cause for her Brexit deal. Whilst examining these historical continuities, Bew rejects the idea that Brexit has brought us back to the “real truth" of Irish history - that there are allies are on the continent and enemies in Britain. Whilst the "flirtation" is there on the Irish side, and we are currently in an environment of bad relations, only some intellectuals on the fringes' seriously hold this view, and for most people there is a gap between confrontational rhetoric and political reality.

In this discussion on using history to make sense of the present, Niamh Gallagher emphasises how messy, subjective and sensitive history can be. Discussing her work on the Northern Ireland Centenary Historical Advisory Panel, she describes the conflicting, irreconcilable views of Northern Ireland. For many Unionists the Centenary is a cause for celebration, whereas for many Republicans it is a reminder of a “great travesty” inflicted on Ireland, and between these camps there’s a whole lot of grey in the middle. We are all attached to our own histories, inherited from our families or our communities, and whipped up by powerful political actors in intervening decades. Historical study cannot bridge this gap completely, and produce consensus on the past. Instead, the Panel wants to inform, shed light on a wide array of experiences and events, and bring out more sources, to maximise the available public record. “We’re not in the business of changing views. We’re just in the business of informing.”